1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

000 grotesquely incompetent brother and the control of Government by the Young Turks almost continuously from 1909 to 1914 by their influence over elections, their instructions to high officials everywhere through party agents and political clubs, and their courts martial which practically suspended the normal course of justice and administration during these years. The high hopes with which Western nations, especially Great Britain, had greeted the new order in 1908 were doomed to disappointment. It is true that repeated crises did much to deprive the C.U.P. of a fair chance and, equally, that the desperate needs of Turkey seemed to call emphatically for a militarily efficient régime: considerations which largely explain the Young Turks' failure to fulfil the expectations evoked, in every subject race, by their early protestations. But there was a deeper reason; the conception of devolution, decentralization, was foreign to even the most enlightened Turkish thought of the time; the 'freedom' offered was freedom as Ottomans, equality as Ottomans. The call to a single Ottoman loyalty, greater centralization, and firmer discipline was the Young Turks' formula for regenerating their country; Arabs, Armenians, and Greeks had hoped for the very opposite. The policy of the governing clique as it developed represented the victory of the more ruthless element in the C.U.P. which sought only in standardization and efficiency the means to rescue the Empire, and which was soon to restore Germany to a privileged, almost to a monopolist, position in Turkish counsels.

722 648 In the 'Iraq wilayas, news of the foreign struggles and defeats of the Turkish Empire excited slight interest even in the towns and among the half-Turkish effendis. The Italian war induced the opening of subscriptions in Baghdad for warlike or war-charitable purposes, with derisory results; some gestures of patriotism were attempted, unreal offers of personal service made, prayers for victory offered; but the ignorance and almost total apathy of the 'Iraq peoples (except the Government hierarchy), their indifference to the grotesquely false communiqués of the Agence Ottomane, their satisfaction rather than dismay at the embarrassments of their masters, made a practical loyalty inconceivable. Some troops were drafted to Europe, recruiting was intensified, full mobilization proclaimed, taxation increased by cesses, officials' salaries diminished by a war levy, and subscriptions invited for warships, aircraft, the Army, the wounded. An internal loan was floated, but evoked a minimum of response.

668 The political revolution in the capital was not, however, without practical results in 'Iraq. Some high officials were at once removed, some political exiles could now return to Istanbul. The telegram of July 1908, announcing immediate elections, created intense

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Haydar, the Finance Minister, and indicated an anticipated expenditure of £11 million in four years. For the moment, great loss was incurred by the disastrous fire which raged on and after 27 August in the Suq al-'Aṭṭariya of Baghdad and was extinguished only after great efforts. The Jews, as usual, were blamed. Slack demand and low prices in the date trade in 1938 and 1939 strained to excess the organization and harmony of the Date Board (p. 262) and led to its replacement, under a new law, by a Date Association in 1939. This was endowed with larger funds and powers, and a field of action covering all southern 'Iraq and all branches of growing and marketing. H. I. Lloyd, a veteran of the 'Iraq service as administrator and judge, became Director-General. An early act of the Association was to grant to Messrs. Andrew Weir a five-year monopoly for handling the purchase and export of packed dates.

The outbreak of War in September 1939 led in Baghdad inevitably to a period of financial and commercial panic, with suspension of credit, a run on the banks, buying and hoarding of food and stocks, and an abrupt rise in prices. But confidence was quickly restored and, though some dislocation of communications and shortage of shipping were felt, economic conditions returned almost to normal. In spite of the State of Emergency declared and the issue of a 'Decree for the organization of 'Iraq's economic resources' with nominal Government control of exports and imports, and the establishment of a Central Supply Board, interference in normal trading was in effect slight. There was no black-out, no air-raid precautions, and little sign of war restrictions save press and postal censorship. The date export was well organized under the new monopoly, and the British Government placed a large order for 'Iraqi barley, which was profitably fulfilled.

The Prime Minister announced on 4 September that 'Iraq would fully honour the terms of the British alliance, and thereunder would furnish all 'facilities and assistance' as provided in the Treaty. Of 'Iraq Army mobilization there was no question. Diplomatic relations with Germany were broken off, Germans interned and their property sequestrated, while their interests were entrusted to the Afghan Legation. Dr. Grobba left the country, and his propaganda organization was temporarily merged in that which had its centre at Teheran. Telegrams were exchanged between the Regent and King George VI, and every assurance given to the British Ambassador of 'Iraq's goodwill and acceptance of its obligations. Nuri Pasha's conceptions went, indeed, further than this; he envisaged a modification of the Sa'dabad Pact such as to lead to joint military and political action by its signatories, whom Egypt might join; but of such projects nothing was in fact realized.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Regent and to the Treaty, among them Nuri Sa'id and Da'ud Haydari, escaped from Baghdad and joined the Amir and their colleagues in Palestine. The new British Ambassador entered Baghdad on 4 April without official greeting by the 'Iraq Government save that of the Amin al-'Aṣima, Arshad al-'Umari, and remained invisible in his Embassy, careful in no way to countenance the new régime. Between himself and Rashid 'Ali personally there was little cordiality. The Gaylani Ministry assumed its functions in a Baghdad Army-dominated, socially frightened, commercially inert. The industrial frustrations of war-time—the stoppage of hopeful factories, the impossibility of importing machinery, and the shortage of vehicles—added to the adverse factors confronting it.

The Government's reception abroad was unfavourable. Turkey and Sa'udi Arabia saw with regret the adoption in 'Iraq of a policy the reverse of their own. In London, where these developments had been little expected, the immediate decision was to secure Baṣra and as much as possible of 'Iraq's other centres and means of communication. To this end an urgent request was sent by Churchill to India to produce troops and land them at Baṣra. A brigade of the 10th Indian Division, with a regiment of artillery and ancillary troops, who were on the point of embarking for the Far East, were diverted and sailed from Karachi for the Gulf on 12 April, under Major-General W. A. K. Fraser. They arrived at Baṣra on 18 April, anticipated by a few hours by a half-battalion of British infantry flown there by the Royal Air Force, to be moved on a fortnight later by air to Ḥabbaniya.

Cornwallis, warned on 12 April of the dispatch of troops, informed the Government accordingly on the 16th. Rashid Ali' first instructed that all facilities should be given for their landing; but three days later he stipulated that the forces disembarked should move forthwith across 'Iraq to Ruṭba or beyond, that troops in transit should never exceed one brigade-group, and that suitable advance notice of arrivals should henceforward be given. Meanwhile, no more troops were to land until the present forces were clear of 'Iraq territory. These arbitrary and clearly unfriendly restrictions were unknown to the spirit or text of the Anglo-'Iraqi Treaty; and this was pointed out by the British Ambassador, whose first personal meeting with Gaylani took place on 26 April and brought them no nearer together. Extensive flooding around Baṣra must anyhow have made the newly-landed force immobile for a time. The Prime Minister on 27 April repeated in writing his demand that the troops at Baṣra should move on; public opinion, he said, was dangerously deteriorating at the sight of this British garrison. Cornwallis's reply was to give warning on 28 April of the arrival of further supporting or ancillary troops, in approximately

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

trans-Persian route. In the latter function the American Army had, from the early days of 1943, the major part to play and, with the deployment of its vast resources, took charge of the arrangements for improving the railway and road network of the Shah's empire and forwarding thereby millions of tons of supplies, transport, and equipment to the depots of the sullen and ungrateful Russians.

The peaceful history of this 'Second Occupation of 'Iraq'—so called by one school of 'Iraqi thought—could not but affect the political background of the territory during these years by its guarantee of comprehensive security, its frustration of any further attempt to involve 'Iraq in the downfall of the doomed Axis, and its living proof that accepted garrisons of well-disciplined and well-disposed foreign troops could be far from a scourge to town and countryside. If the British forces by their immense local disbursements for goods and services, their employment of labour, their competition for the services of the few skilled artisans, and their shipment of grain and animals to other theatres of war inevitably contributed to the inflation and the connected economic evils of war-time 'Iraq, they created also the remarkable prosperity which most classes of the population enjoyed. Nor could observers fail to recognize the excellence of the relations maintained, during five years of mental strain and physical propinquity, between these troops and the civil population. Under the inspiration of the Ambassador and his staff every consideration was shown to the 'Iraqi authorities and public, and these for their part wisely acquiesced in the temporary presence of British troops in their territory. Neither the conduct of troops nor the military authorities' use of their predominant power could be the subject of complaint; indeed, the slight extent to which the normal administration was affected by, or needed to take account of, the British forces was surprising. Relations with the 'Iraq Army varied from outwardly correct to nearly cordial; with the Regent they were excellent. He accepted in 1943 the honorary rank of Air Commodore in the Royal Air Force, and a dozen high officials of Government were awarded, for valuable war-time services, various (honorary) grades of the Order of the British Empire.

The British position in 'Iraq during these years was, by force of circumstances, as different effectively from what it had been from 1932 to 1941 as it was different constitutionally from mandatory times. It was clearly dominant, had dominance been desired; but in fact it was more concerned to strengthen the hand of the 'Iraq Government than to supersede it. Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, from whose character and experience the nation was thus able again to benefit, remained at the Embassy until 1945 to link amicably the British military and the 'Iraqi civil worlds, and to offer objective

1: Longrigg G-4, 8 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

exchanged between Nuri Pasha and Mr. Churchill: but no important practical results could be expected from this move, which at best would serve to secure for the country a better place at the Peace Conference, and meanwhile to establish its leadership in the Arab world. Public opinion, which showed neither enthusiasm nor dismay at the declaration of war, and felt little resulting sense of obligation, was unlikely to support its Prime Minister to the extent of sending 'Iraqi troops abroad; nor was the Army yet capable of foreign operations. This condition improved gradually with the Allied successes in North Africa, visits were organized for 'Iraqi officers to the Libyan battlefields, and the British Mission under Major-General G. Bromilow, successor to Major-General Waterhouse, did what it could to restore Army morale and comradeship. Meanwhile, in default of fighting, 'Iraq's contribution to the Allied war effort was not negligible; camp sites and lands were offered without rent, buildings were surrendered under requisition without demur. Economic controls were introduced under British advice; the management of river traffic and the Port was shared or surrendered, and the widest military use of the railway system accepted. Priority was given to Army man-power requirements, the telegraph and telephone system placed at military disposal, and grain supplies provided.

Difficulties of procurement, and the economic unbalance which was afflicting 'Iraq at this period, prevented the pursuit of such major projects as had been intended. Nevertheless, urban development could proceed—not least in the capital—suburbs could be planned and partly built, and a beginning could be made with working-class dwellings to replace insanitary labyrinths of mud and petrol-tin hovels: indeed, the war years witnessed great changes in the aspect of the towns. Municipal institutions themselves were multiplying and developing; and, small as were the resources of most corporations, the total of their revenues tripled during these five years. By a pleasing gesture the Lord Mayor of London presented, with suitable fraternal messages, a chain of office to the Amin al-'Asima. The Health services continued to develop. Doctors working for the Administration and private practitioners increased in numbers, recruited mainly from the Royal Medical College in Baghdad. British specialists, who had served the country and their science now for twenty years, still played their invaluable part. In Education also the period was far from one of stagnation. A revised Public Education Law was passed; primary, intermediate, and secondary schools—boys, girls, and mixed—all rose in numbers, and many new private schools were founded. Pupils sent for higher studies abroad were few during the war, but the flow recommenced strongly in 1944. A

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

4. WAR-TIME ECONOMICS

722 511 More even than in political, administrative, or military activities, the dominant and largely unsolved problems of war-time 'Iraq lay in its economic life. This was abnormally disturbed; it was marked by phenomena common in the war history of many countries, those of high prices, shortage of needed supplies, and great increase of apparent wealth; and it profoundly affected the daily lives of the public.

565 511 The chief social effect of these conditions was the heightened contrast between the classes who made money from trade, contracts, sales of produce, and the many opportunities of the times, and those who did not. At one extreme were the merchants—many acting as such for the first time—middlemen with a gift for manipulating licences, Army contractors, and landowners with crops to sell. In the middle, and not unprosperous, were the self-sufficient cultivators receiving high prices and enabled in many cases to free themselves from the debts of a lifetime, shopkeepers and transport operators serving a swollen and moneyed military and civil public, artisans with their services everywhere in demand, and labourers sure of military employment so long as the British forces needed 60,000 of them. The poor were those tied, like Government officials, to fixed money incomes augmented at best by war-time allowances which ever lagged behind prices, and the writers and journalists and half-employed prowlers on the fringe of the professions and of politics. The effect of wealth on the first of these classes was to remove them, with higher material standards and demands, farther from the bulk of their countrymen; and that of hard times on the impoverished classes was sadly to lower the standards among the body of Government officials, and to drive a large part of the embittered and hungry middle class farther—and sometimes very far—to the Left. The structure of [182] society was loosened, solidarity and mutual respect decreased. Politically the discontents and frustrations of daily life were reflected, in bitterness or clashing aims, in the circles of the Cabinet and the deputies, and multiplied the embarrassments of successive Ministries. As in many another country, neither statesmen nor functionaries could produce the firm wisdom or the administrative technique to meet the conflicting stresses of a complicated and imperfectly diagnosed situation, which lasted for five years.

433 439 'Iraq's main contribution to the world's wealth, its grain and dates, continued to be produced with the annual variations due to rainfall, floods, pests, and canal performance. The crops were in part consumed by the growers, in part acquired by Government for resale, in part bought with Government authorization by the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

British forces for their own needs, in part acquired by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation for export to Great Britain or other territories, and in part exported by normal trade channels now regulated by export control. The date crop was still handled for export by Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co. The cotton which Japan ceased to take after 1941 was sent to India, but in quantities which high grain prices had much reduced; production touched 26,000 bales in 1940, but thereafter dropped for the next nine years to a fifth or even a tenth of that amount. Wool was sent to America, but with this and all other commodities both internal movement by land and water and the provision of shipping space from Baṣra presented difficult problems. A quantity of produce went by rail to the Levant and Turkey, and animals on the hoof, in years of good grazing, were sent to the British forces in Syria. The prices of all commodities were fixed in terms of imperious war necessity and of ever-growing 'Iraqi inflation, to which these prices contributed.

The import of manufactured articles and certain foodstuffs was limited to quantities below the level of satisfaction, thanks to reduced outputs in the supplying countries and to pressure on shipping space. Help was forthcoming more than once from American lend-lease stocks of drugs, metal goods, tyres, chemicals, and agricultural implements; Paiforce at times could help to meet an urgent shortage, and the British Government organized an emergency grain supply in 1942 from India and Canada; but, as in every country, abiding and irksome shortages remained, aggravated by maldistribution and by a habit of hoarding against which the law and public opinion strove equally in vain. The need at all costs to obtain supplies led to the urgent search for sources to replace Japan and other belligerents. An import licence system was established which, vastly profitable to some, worked with its share of imperfections and abuses; a price-fixing procedure was applied over a wide range of articles, with an attempted control of stocks enforced by occasional raids and prosecutions, but avoided by widespread black-market trading; and a rationing system, first applied to sugar in 1942, was extended next year to coffee and tea and later to cotton and woollen textiles. This control by ration-cards, based on imperfect tribal and urban lists, was a matter of extreme difficulty and gladly abandoned at the earliest moment; nor were the resulting stocks ever sufficient to admit an adequate allowance to the tribal public. Nevertheless, the rationing of essentials was both indispensable and attended with fair success. Late in 1944, in expectation of the war's end and by reaction from the attempted régime of universal close control in 1943–4, a policy of decontrol was substituted, and one commodity after another

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

722 was exempted from licensing and price-fixing. During 1945 all
434 controls were discontinued as far as sterling-area commerce was concerned, and traders with one accord sought supplies from every quarter; but freedom of traffic was still hampered by shipping shortages, currency restrictions, and world-wide dearth of goods.
457 The country's requirements in 'hard' currencies, chiefly dollars, were met by an arrangement with Great Britain in March 1945, whereby sums up to the equivalent of $14 million could be converted from 'Iraq's accumulated sterling balances, an arrangement which was to be annually re-negotiated. The restricted convertibility of 'Iraq's own dinars into dollars remained incomprehensible to the public, as to publics everywhere.

722 In the task of economic control, which fell ultimately to the lot
647 of local officials, helped, it might be, by the municipality or Chamber of Commerce, more than moderate results could not be expected from improvised systems based on no adequate statistics or machinery, and applied by unspecialized and impecunious officials to a puzzled and resentful public. The higher economic control of the territory, under a law repeatedly revised and productive of innumerable regulations, was placed originally in the hands of a Central Supply Committee, later in those of a smaller ministerial body, the High Supply Committee, which long survived the war. Many problems called for resolution at Cabinet level, where they multiplied disagreement between ministers. Departments of Transport, Imports and Local Resources, founded early in the war and served by British as well as 'Iraqi officials—Lloyd, Grice, le Blanc—were grouped early in 1944 under the Ministry of Supply established for the purpose; its first Adviser, Colonel P. Bayliss, after a few months of dynamic and impatient activity, retired through disagreement with his colleagues. An Anglo-American-'Iraqi Co-ordinating Committee lasted for a few months from midsummer 1944. Outside the territory, but concerned with its output and controlling foreign supplies to it, was the Middle East Supply Centre in Cairo, of which a conference attended by 'Iraqi delegates was held in Cairo in April 1944; and 'Iraq had in 1943 been toured, under M.E.S.C. auspices, by a Scientific Advisory Mission which produced the valuable reports of Dr. B. A. Keen and Dr. E. B. Worthington. The Centre performed important services in conditions where benevolent inter-territory control was indispensable; it was, nevertheless, commonly blamed in 'Iraq for its meagre allocation of supplies, and its abolition late in 1945 was unregretted by 'Iraqis to whom their own country's needs were paramount, those of the Allies and of the War remote and meaningless. It was succeeded until 1947 by a Supply Mission which kept control of a few scarce items of supply.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Had it been possible for broader views on practical economic internationalism to prevail in 'Iraq and its neighbours, valuable lessons could perhaps have been drawn from the operations of M.E.S.C.

The shortage of goods, the high price of local produce, and the abundant military expenditure could not be without effect on living standards. Until the middle of 1941 the country's economy was almost normal; prices rose little and currency in circulation had scarcely increased. But thereafter conditions quickly deteriorated. A poor harvest, the decrease in imports, and military expenditure produced conditions of menacing inflation. Government had no better solution than half-hearted and unenforced regulations to deal with the problems of procurement, control, and distribution, which in a few weeks became urgent. The cost of living rose in 1942 to a level of three or even four times that of 1939. The volume of currency in circulation rose threefold, then sixfold, while bank deposits increased correspondingly. Government, happy to receive the greatly increased revenues which rescued it from the alarming penury of mid-1941, was unwilling to adopt strong measures to drain off purchasing power by higher taxation, or by loan issues (until 1945), or by the sale of State lands save on a trifling scale: was unwilling, indeed, to adopt the firm but unpopular measures for which the situation called. Some sales of gold and of diamonds made available by the British Government could do little to correct the position. A slight improvement, thanks to an abundant harvest and lower export-prices, was achieved in 1943 and prevented a further rise of living costs, already six times those of 1939. But the armistice found conditions in the territory scarcely less inflationary, and the tone of its society scarcely healthier.

Government finance in war-time pursued an abnormal course. The three years 1941–3, in spite of high costs, showed useful surpluses; foreign debts could be paid, war-time allowances were made to officials, and development plans were viewed hopefully. But the two following years gave a less happy result; Government revenues did not keep pace with expenditure, the social services and the Police were allowed to expand, and officials multiplied. Normal expenditure, ID 8 million in 1939, reached ID 15 million in 1943 and ID 21 million in 1945. This last year found 'Iraq approaching a financial position less sound than it appeared. The separate finances of the Railways and the Port of Baṣra were highly prosperous throughout the war.

'Iraq's first internal loan, issued early in 1945, was in two parts. The first was a loan of ID 1 million bearing 2 per cent. interest for twenty years, and 2 per cent. in lottery prizes; the second was of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

652 the same amount at 3 per cent. interest, redeemable in ten years. The loans, regarded as experimental, were well received but too small to be of deflationary value. The Banco di Roma disappeared in 1941. The State-owned Rafidain Bank opened in the same year and handled Government accounts; by 1945 its trading began to show profit. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank developed within narrow limits during the war period, and in 1945 a division into two separate institutions, for Agriculture and for Industry, was decided, to be followed later by connected Real Estate and Mortgage Banks. The Arab Bank (of Palestine) opened a branch in Baghdad in the same year.

722 The material development of the territory, which proceeded
496 hopefully till 1941, was thereafter of necessity neglected until the end of the war. But 'Iraq was at least fortunate in that, far from a record of destruction or retrogression—the common fate of Europe—it gained considerable additions, at others' expense, to its communication system. The railway rolling stock was augmented by war-time loans from the military authorities, current maintenance was assured by military help in vehicles and equipment from British or lend-lease sources and, for a time, by numbers of imported railway workers, and problems of excessive traffic—notably in goods for Turkey and the Levant, and in grain for movement to Baṣra—were amicably handled. The military Kut–
499 'Aziziya–Ba'quba line was removed after the war. By 1945 it was possible for the Railway Directorate to plan again in terms of major development; its projects included a Baghdad rail-and-road bridge (in replacement of the old waggon-ferry), a bridge at Musayib to give access to Karbalā, a modern station and office block and new marshalling yards at Baghdad, and a sixty-five-mile extension of the line from Kirkuk to Arbil, with a Lesser Zab bridge.[1]

722 The important developments at the Port of Baṣra and its vicinity
504 carried out by military agency included wharves, sidings and approaches, storage facilities, the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab bridge, and a Ma'qil–Ahwaz railway line. Considerable parts of these additions survived the disappearance of Paiforce, though the military jetties at Umm Qaṣr on the Khawr 'Abdullah, and the railway joining these to Baṣra, were dismantled. The military control of Tigris river traffic, relinquished in 1945, bequeathed a permanent legacy of river improvement and repair facilities. With the disappearance
505 of military traffic, the Lynch boats and their rivals could again dispute the civilian traffic, which could not long suffice for all.

[1] Other projects studied at the time were the conversion of all metre-gauge lines to standard gauge, a Baghdad–Homs line across the desert, a standard-gauge line from Kut into Persia, a Karbalā–Najf–Kufa line, and a standard-gauge Mosul–Diyarbakr connexion. None of these materialized.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

433 increased on a small scale: the tanning industry was partly mechanized and the quality of its output improved. The two existing mechanically operated wool factories, the unmodernized distilleries, the three cotton ginneries, the small soap-works and cigarette factories, were increased during the war by an attempt at brewing, a primitive glass-works, a factory for paint and another for wax matches. The long-planned cement factory was not yet in production. An important cotton-spinning and weaving project had been initiated, but had not yet begun to operate. A plan to create a cinema studio in Baghdad was in 1945 the object of a visit by a British expert.

382 722 The necessity of postponing further oil development was, equally to the British companies and to the Government, the more regrettable as it seemed not to apply to comparable enterprises in Persia or Arabia; in the former, aviation spirit and other products were produced on a vast scale for war purposes, and in the latter American industry could find abundant equipment when British could not, and could secure for Sa'udi Arabia a long lead in production. The I.P.C. was forced to renounce until after the war the additional pipelines and consequent additional production which it had planned in 1938; indeed, its output was forced down by events in the Levant in 1941–2 from four to two million tons, and restored to full capacity only in 1944. The damage done to its installations in May 1941 was soon repaired, and it was able to assist the British forces by the provision of quarters and air-fields, loan of personnel, communications facilities, and the supply of refined products. The output of these was increased for war purposes, and plant at Kirkuk was improvised for the supply of motor spirit additional to that from Alwand. Factories for making tins were opened at Kirkuk and Mosul, and the two centres connected by pipeline. In Baṣra area a pipeline was built to connect Abadan and Shu'ayba. The destruction of many wells at Kirkuk as a precautionary measure against enemy invasion was ordered by the Army in 1942, but fortunately did not interfere with current production. Drilling was suspended from mid-1941 until the latter part of the war. In the area of the Mosul Petroleum Company (formerly B.O.D.) no operations were possible during the war at 'Ayn Zala or elsewhere, though at Baṣra exploration continued. These postponements, unavoidable in conditions which made engineering supplies unobtainable, were formally authorized by an agreement between the Companies and the Government in March 1943, whereby in return for a loan of ID 1,500,000 the Government granted a 'period of suspension' to begin in May 1941 and to run until two years after the armistice. Meanwhile the project of a Government refinery remained alive, though at present untimely; and to question the terms—or

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

even the basic validity—of the oil concessions was a usual move of politicians in opposition.

In the greatest of 'Iraq's industries, that of agriculture, the war was a period of unusual activity, stimulated by the need to produce and by high prices. Agricultural machinery, thanks to lend-lease supplies, was seen almost for the first time in the northern liwās and those of Baghdad and Kut; in 1945 some scores of tractors, mechanical ploughs, cultivators, and combines were in operation, with great effect on 'Iraqi conceptions of agricultural possibilities. Projects for ambitious modern farming took shape among the educated and the owners of capital; a College of Agriculture had been founded in 1941; and a law was passed in 1944 authorizing the establishment of agricultural Co-operative Societies. But none of these measures prevented the increasing drift of countrymen in their hundreds or thousands towards the towns, where war-time employment was plentiful. In the field of land settlement, the committees, which had worked steadily and in increased numbers since 1933, were wisely kept at their all-important tasks throughout the war. Only minor attention was given as yet to southern 'Iraq, and little to Mosul, Arbil, Dulaym, Diwaniya, or Karbalā liwās; but much was done in the dispute-ridden agricultural lands of Kirkuk, Baghdad, Ḥilla, and Diyalā, where good progress was made with definition of land categories, the mapping of boundaries, and the recording of individual registrations over areas which now approached a million acres. Much was heard of plans both for model villages and for the allotment of small-holdings of Government land to single families—a sign that the evils of peasant insecurity, poverty, and lack of incentive were now fully realized. On the Dujayla Canal, dependent on the Kut barrage, work under a special law started in 1945 on a practical settlement of families on sixty-acre State-owned plots, with the incentive of free title to be gained after ten years of work; and meanwhile village institutions and amenities—school, farm offices, nurseries, dispensaries, and a co-operative store—were provided by the Directorate. The Dujayla Scheme was full of promise; it started with eighty carefully-chosen families, later to be multiplied tenfold, and it aroused keen competition for admission.

'Iraq's security after 1941 allowed its vital Irrigation services to continue their canal maintenance and flood protection, their studies and planning, though the intended major projects could not at present be initiated. The work interrupted in 1941 on the Ḥabbaniya–Abu Dibis outlet was completed by 1943, and the intake-channel from the river (begun under Willcocks) and the return-channel to it, were redesigned but not yet undertaken. Pump irrigation was fully maintained.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

'Iraqis, recruited by the Palestine Defence League, entered Palestine and served or offered to serve with Fawzi al-Qawuqchi and the Palestine leaders; they were inspired perhaps by genuine devotion but were of negligible fighting capacity. The inefficacy of this force, and the collapse of Arab resistance in the face of Jewish terrorism and their resolute forces, led the League to decide, before the official end of the Mandate, upon the intervention of Arab regular armies. In April the Regent, whose leadership and vitality regained him much of his popularity, visited 'Amman and Cairo with the Ministers of Defence, Finance, and Foreign Affairs. Student hunger strikes were called in Baghdad to urge the dispatch of the Army to Palestine, the closure of the Haifa pipeline, and a welcome for the Palestine exiles; and the Government of al-Ṣadr saw no alternative to following the League policy of large-scale intervention, however sketchily co-ordinated. 'Iraqi forces under General Ṣaliḥ Ṣa'ib—forces ill prepared, ill equipped, and with clearly inadequate supplies and reserves—moved from their home stations some ten to twelve thousand strong in mechanized or lorry-borne units, and took up positions on the western fringes of the Jordan Kingdom. They crossed into their allotted sector of Palestine on 15 May, immediately after the State of Israel had been proclaimed.

The outbreak of this war—the first occasion upon which its troops were used abroad—was the signal for the imposition of martial law throughout 'Iraq: a step happy only in its immediate restoration of outward tranquillity, but indicative of no real solution of any of the nation's problems. The emergency régime, which facilitated Government control over the elections, was marked by strict censorship, the opening of a concentration camp in the southern desert for the many arrested trouble-makers, the subordination of civil to military officials in all areas, and the establishment of military courts. It prohibited the carrying of firearms and the use of cypher codes, and by the supersession of many existing laws it involved a close restriction of civil rights. The clash between civil and military authorities increased as weeks went by with irritation, jealousy, and charges and counter-charges of indiscriminate severity or weak indulgence: Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams were soon heard to ask 'Which is the worse, government by students or by Army officers?' The press, swollen to an extraordinary number of daily sheets of trifling circulation but irresponsible violence, lost in a day the worst of its venom (except such as could be safely directed against the British or the Jews), and the few papers which refused compliance were suppressed. A ceremonial parade of the police in Baghdad did something to restore their morale. The Palestine war aroused enthusiastic

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verbal support in every quarter and the Baghdad Jews vied ostentatiously with Muslims in anti-Zionist fervour and subscribed heavily to funds for the refugees.

But the campaign was from the first feebly and unfortunately conducted. The higher leadership was uninspiring, supply arrangements inadequate, and the discipline and bearing of the 'Iraqi troops, though judged to be superior to those of other Arab States except Jordan, carried them to little glory. Units entered Palestine on 15 May between Geshen and Wadi Yabis and marched on Tul Karm and Nablus, areas unoccupied by the Jews; their attempt on Tiberias was unsuccessful, but they effectively occupied the Nablus–Tiberias–Janin triangle and advanced to within twelve miles of Tel Aviv. This hopeful move was frustrated by Jewish resistance in front of Nathaniya and by counter-pressure which forced the 'Iraqis to abandon Bayt Tima and give ground in the occupied triangle. The Security Council's cease-fire order of 22 May had been at first ignored by all, but both sides accepted a four-weeks' truce operative on 11 June. The impetus of Arab invasion had by that time been lost, their weakness exposed, and their initial superiority in heavy arms, which was never to recur, had availed them little; and during the truce period equipment poured into the Jewish Army, none into the Arab. After the rejection of proposals evolved by the United Nations mediator, Count Bernadotte, and his Truce Commission for a federation of Arab and Jewish States in Palestine and Jordan, fighting was renewed on 9 July. A further 'Iraqi attempt to take Nathaniya was foiled, the Jews swept into Galilee, and their deeper advance was stopped only by the second truce which was observed from 18 July. This at the Arab League meeting at Aley was rejected only by the 'Iraq Government, and that for reasons of pride and policy; but it was in fact operative and the war, for 'Iraq, was over.

The many attempts to restore peace to Palestine and solve its insoluble problems, the murder of Bernadotte by the Jews, the renewal of Israeli-Egyptian hostilities from October to the end of 1948, form no part of the history of 'Iraq. 'Iraq Army units remained in occupation of the east Palestine triangle for some months, dependent as ever on their long line of communications through Jordan and receiving their pay irregularly from the almost empty Treasury at home. Ṣalih Ṣa'ib was recalled to 'Iraq as Chief of Staff, to return again to Palestine later as Commander-in-Chief of the combined 'Iraqi-Jordan forces; but this experiment in joint command lasted but a few weeks, and the wider project of a unified command for all League forces—a clear military necessity—was frustrated by division among the States and by Egyptian refusal. No real effect was given to the resolution of the 'Iraqi

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

alone, were for abandoning Palestine altogether. The formation of an Assyrian Brigade, initiated by the Regent and actively in hand late in 1948, was frustrated by the jealousies and fears of Arab nationalists. The policy of the Pachachi Cabinet was to keep troops in Palestine, to reject (but conform to) the second truce, to refuse all negotiations with Israel, and to blame the British Government for ceasing to supply arms. They spurned the Bernadotte proposals for partition and peace, recognized the Mufti's Government while standing solid with King 'Abdullah who scornfully rejected it—and waited month after month for they knew not what.

If fair security was maintained at home during these months it was by reason of the continuation of martial law. Within this régime, of which the termination was viewed with alarm, the disturbing hostilities between civil and military authorities continued, and it became necessary to restrict the military courts, each one a battle-ground between the forces of the Mutaṣarrif and the local general, first to a limited class of case—those concerned with Palestine and with Communism—and then to a single tribunal in Baghdad. Communism played its part in every strike and street demonstration, and had friends in the public services and in the Army; the severities of 1947 had left vigorous life in its underground organization, which further arrests late in 1948 and the seizure of an illegal press still left formidable. The effective alliance between Kurdish nationalism and Russo-Kurdish Communism, which helped to transfer the leadership of Kurdish separatism from the Aghās to the intelligentsia, led during 1948 to endless disorders in the streets and schools of Sulaymaniya with an uneasy succession of arrests, releases, and rearrests. The infiltration of propaganda from Persian and Russian soil continued, and the newspaper *Azadi* still circulated. Elsewhere in 'Iraq the tribes were quiet.

Town security improved in spite of minor election rioting, with student and sometimes hooligan demonstrations on any pretext repeated *ad nauseam*. An increase of hostile pressure on the Baghdad Jews, in spite of their centuries of 'Iraqi citizenship and their anti-Zionism, was in these conditions psychologically inevitable; in the autumn of 1949 arrests of Jews included that of a whole assembly in the 'Amara synagogue, and protests from Israel at these and at alleged detentions in concentration camps reached the United Nations. The connexion between Zionism and Communism was taken for granted by popular outcry; Jew and Zionist were identified; and the sight of the terrified community, declared to be selling 'Iraqi military secrets to Palestine, aroused in some the worst instincts of spite and bullying. But more intelligent and more chivalrous attitudes were not lacking, and a number of

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

CHAPTER IV

INITIATION OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATION

WHILE the extension of the campaign to Baghdad and the future of the country were being discussed in official circles, the practical problem of the administration of the occupied areas was forced upon those in command of the Expeditionary Force. Even had there been no obligation under international usage, as the Hague Conventions of 1890 and of 1907,[1] the needs of the Force and the necessity of replacing the vacuum left by the departure of the Turks rendered the initiation of some form of administration imperative.

The local requirements of the troops were wide and varied. Such needs as were not met by direct intervention of the military authorities necessitated an intricate mass of detailed orders, proclamations and notices issued under the authority of the General Officer Commanding and enforced for the most part by military police and military courts. These regulations supervised the direct relations between the inhabitants and the army, ranging from the control of rents[2] and foodstuffs,[3] the restriction of movement of persons and of rivercraft,[4] to orders that carriage drivers and boatmen 'shall in all cases give preference to British Officers, European ladies and Government

[1] Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annexed to Hague Convention, July 29th, 1899, affirmed in a similar Convention of the Hague, October 18th, 1907. Texts: *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, Vol. XCI (1898-9), 988; Vol. C (1906-7), 338.

[2] *Compilation of Proclamations and Notifications Affecting Civil Inhabitants of Mesopotamia in Basrah* (Baghdad, 1919), Notification No. 2 (hereafter *Procs. Basrah*).

[3] Ibid., Notif. No. 5; *Proclamations and Notifications, 'Amarah* (Baghdad, 1919), No. 1, Sec. 14 (hereafter *Procs. 'Amarah*).

[4] *Procs. Basrah*, Notif. No. 6, Regulation Nos. 12, 13; *Procs. 'Amarah*, Proc. No. 1, Secs. 2, 3, and 9.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

servants'.[1] Regulations governed indirect relations, from the control of the carrying of arms among the inhabitants,[2] the sale of liquors and drugs[3] to minute sanitary regulations prescribing floor space per animal in stables or rewards for bringing in dogs for destruction.[4]

In all these relations between the civil population and the military authorities, the fact was never lost sight of that it was a military occupation and that a war had to be won. From the first to the last, the needs of the inhabitants were subordinated to those of the occupying Forces. Food, in certain cases, was admitted to market for sale only when the requirements of the military authorities had been met.[5] Access to piped water was forbidden.[6] Families were evicted from their houses and land requisitioned, sometimes without payment of rent.[7] Restrictions on persons and goods were carried to unnecessary lengths, even after the danger from spies had vanished.[8] Labourers in ever-increasing quantities were taken from their fields and villages and from their families and forced to work on military works, such forced labour becoming, as in Egypt, one of the outstanding grievances of the inhabitants against the British authorities.[9]

Delicate handling by the Political Officers was necessary in order to enforce the orders and regulations, harsh and exacting as many of them were, and at the same time to keep the

[1] *Procs. Barrah*, Reg. No. 12, Sec. 11.
[2] Ibid., Reg. No. 12; *Procs. 'Amarah*, Proc. No. 1, Sec. 4.
[3] Ibid., Reg. No. 12, Sec. 9; *Procs. 'Amarah*, Proc. No. 1, Sec. 7; Notice No. 5.
[4] Ibid., Notice No. 1, No. 10; *Procs. 'Amarah*, Proc. No. 1, Sec. 14.
[5] *Procs. 'Amarah*, Proc. No. 1, Sec. 14.
[6] Ibid., Notice No. 3.
[7] No rent was paid from the time of the Occupation on the four or five miles of river frontage occupied by the British at 'Amara. *Monthly Reports, Political Officers*, December, 1918, 'Amara, p. 2.
[8] Wilson, Sir A. T., op. cit., pp. 144, 242; *Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia* (1920), Cmd. No. 1061, p. 24 (hereafter *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920).
[9] Telegram No. 7520, Civil Commissioner to S/S for India, July 13th, 1919. The telegram indicates that by that date both the Civil Commissioner and the General Officer Commanding were 'fully alive to the importance of abolishing forced labour at the earliest possible moment'.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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645 The General's Cabinet dissolved all the political parties in-
666 cluding the Constitutional Union, but conceded the opposition
665 demand for single-stage elections. Elections, carried out in January 1953, were boycotted by all but one of the former opposition parties, including that of Salih Jabr, on the charge of governmental control. The resulting chamber naturally showed an enormous majority for Nuri as-Said, though neither the boycott nor the existence of martial law can greatly have affected the issue: the extreme parties had anyway no prospect of success and it would appear that the party of Salih Jabr, in spite of its alleged expectations, was already outmanœuvred. The Cabinet which was subsequently formed under Jamil [185] Midfai remained in power till September; it apparently abandoned and indeed reversed its predecessor's cautious [722] attempt at economic reform. With martial law in force for little short of a year, political activity and polemic was for the time being stilled; but the suppression of a riot and the election of a conservative Parliament have not altered the fundamentals of the situation. A new Cabinet was formed on 16 September by Dr Mohammed Fadhil Jamali, former President of the Chamber of Deputies; martial law was ended by royal decree on 8 October and political parties were permitted to resume their activities.

668 But urban unrest, inflamed by the increasing participation of students in politics, can be expected to continue and spread, eventually to the rural population as well, so long as the public believes that the economics and administration of the country are subjected to the interest of a ruling class and its supposed allies among Western imperialist Powers who, in its opinion, maintain the State of Israel and are likely to involve Iraq on their own side in a third world war. Much of the bitterness with which this belief is held springs from privation or the fear of it. Once substantial results appear from the new programme of development, and the public is made aware of them, a foundation will have been laid for political stability.

Government and Constitution

643 The King of Iraq is King Faisal II, son of King Ghazi and
642 grandson of King Faisal ibn Hussain. The legislative power is
646 vested with the King in Parliament. Parliament consists of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Senators are appointed by the King from among those who 'by their acts have gained the confidence and trust of the people, and those who have an honourable past in the service of the Government and the country'. In number they may not exceed one-fourth of the

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THE INFECTION IS FREQUENTLY INTRODUCED BY means of the pilgrimage traffic or tribal migrations from the neighboring territories, and is believed to smolder continuously in the northeastern mountain districts. Cases are usually observed during the winter and the spring months, with the maximum incidence in March and April. Serious outbreaks, with a total of over 1,300 known cases, were reported in 1942-43 in conjunction with epidemics prevailing throughout the entire Middle East. The actual prevalence was probably several times the official estimates. The greatest numbers of cases were noted in Baghdad, and in Basra, Mosul, Diyala and Sulaimaniya *liwas*, along the main routes from Iran. The congestion and the shortage of food, clothing, soaps and other supplies existing in that area as the result of military operations during World War II favored the spread of the infection among the louse-infested populations. About 800 cases of typhus were reported in 1944, but the annual incidence subsequently declined to a low of 72 cases in 1949. No differentiation is made as to type, and the recorded cases include both louse-borne and flea-borne infections. On the basis of laboratory investigations, authorities at the Royal Hospital in Baghdad suggest that many outbreaks in the north, where louse-borne typhus is supposedly endemic, are caused by strains which are serologically intermediate between *Rickettsia prowazeki* and *R. mooseri*. [136]

Murine typhus is endemic, and probably predominates in the rural areas in the absence of a large-scale epidemic. Tick-borne infections are not specifically reported, and are undoubtedly rare. In the event of a typhus outbreak, control measures, including the use of DDT preparations and mass immunization of the inhabitants with antityphus vaccines, are carried on in the affected communities by the government health authorities.

Plague. Epidemics of plague were frequent in the past, particularly in the region around Baghdad, but the disease has been almost completely absent within recent YEARS.

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